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“A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM” 


















Rand	must	appear	an	unlikely	 champion	of	modernism	 in	architecture.	 Indeed,	
Rand’s	 egoist	 philosophy	 presents	 a	 perfect	 example	 of	 that	mistrust	 of	 grand	
narrative	 now	 recognized	 to	 be	 central	 to	 the	 ‘cultural	 logic	 of	 late-capitalism’,	
post-modernism.	In	place	of	‘all	the	variants	of	modern	collectivism	(communist,	
fascist,	Nazi,	etc.),	which	preserve	the	religious-altruist	ethics	in	full	and	merely	
substitute	 “society”	 for	 God	 as	 the	 bene;iciary	 of	 man’s	 self-immolation’,	 Rand	
proposes	a	new	social	order	geared	to	the	individual:	‘a	free,	productive,	rational	
system	that	 rewards	 the	best	 in	every	man,	and	which	 is,	 [as	Frederic	 Jameson	
rather	feared	it	might	be]	obviously,	laissez-faire	capitalism’. 		3
	 	 	 	 	In	fact,	Rand’s	philosophy	has	had	a	role	equal	or	greater	than	that	of	Milton	
Friedman	or	F.A.	Hayek	in	shaping	a	contemporary	neo-liberal	consensus,	having	
had	an	avowed	impact	upon	theorists	such	as	George	Gilder,	whose	Wealth	and	








Greenspan,	Chairman	of	 the	U.S.	 Federal	Reserve	between	1987	and	2006,	 and	
perhaps	the	primary	architect	of	our	highly	deregulated	and	globalised	;inancial	
order	is	her	protégé. 	4
	 	 	 	 	And	yet,	there	is	clearly	no	discrepancy	between	Roark’s	modernist	practice	
and	his	“post-modernist”	philosophy.	The	fact	is	that	Rand	presents	readers	with	
a	total	philosophy	for	living	–	in	a	period	supposedly	wary	of	the	great	modernist	
passion	 for	 system	building.	 ‘Weary	 from	Communism,	 fascism,	 and	 two	world	
wars	intellectuals	were	above	all	uninterested	in	ideology,’	writes	Jennifer	Burns	
in	 her	 biography	 The	 Goddess	 of	 the	 Markets	 (2009):	 ‘Rand’s	 Objectivism,	 a	
completely	 integrated	 rational,	 atheistic	 philosophical	 system	 delivered	 via	 a	
thousand-page	 novel,	was	 simply	 not	what	most	 established	 intellectuals	were	







of	a	 later	generation,	 in	 the	sixties.	To	some	extent	 this	 is	clearly	correct.	But,	 I	
suggest,	this	analogy	only	serves	to	underscore	the	inadequacy	of	the	theoretical	
terms	coined	in	that	;irst,	heroic	attempt	to	describe	theories	and	practices	that	
had	 no	 place	 in	what	was	 then	 universally	 agreed	 to	 constitute	 the	modernist	
movement:	 neither	 in	 the	 (radical)	 empiricist	 tradition	 that	 inspired	 Marcel	
Proust’s	 La	 recherche	 du	 temps	 perdu	 and	 Gertrude	 Stein’s	 The	 Making	 of	




to	 possess	 no	 obvious	 precedent:	 and	 was	 therefore	 declared	 to	 be	 post-
modernist.	I	suggest	this	is	a	mistake.	
					In	this	article	I	propose	to	show	that	Rand’s	Objectivism	must	be	recognized	as	





Levenson,	Bruce	Clarke,	 John	F.	Welsh,	 and	Michel	Rabaté,	 this	 body	of	writing	
has	never	been	considered	together:	and	understood	to	constitute	a	modernism	
possessing	 a	philosophical	 basis	distinct	 from	 that	 of	 the	mainstreams.	 I	 argue	
that,	through	Ayn	Rand	primarily,	the	modernism	of	radical	subjectivity	survived	
well	beyond	the	point	thought	to	mark	its	extinction	post-WWI;	that	the	cultural	
logic	 of	 late	 capitalism	 is	 based,	 to	 a	 signi;icant	 degree,	 upon	 this	 modernist	
interpretation	 of	 Stirnerian	 Egoism.	 The	 political	 urgency	 of	 the	 reappraisal	
undertaken	 in	 this	 essay	need	hardly	be	 spelt	 out.	 Endeavors	 to	 engage	with	 a	
contemporary	hyper-modernist	transformation	of	our	city-spaces,	with	the	slow	
perversion	of	our	social	and	economic	systems,	must	remain	ineffectual	as	long	



















phoenix,	 possessing	 no	 context	 save	 her	 own	 creativity,	 the	 fountainhead	 that	
produced	 the	 universe	 they	 inhabit,	 ex	 nihilio.	 ‘It	 is	 the	 content	 of	 a	 person’s	
brain,	not	the	accidental	details	of	his	life,	that	determines	his	character.	My	own	
character	 is	 in	 the	pages	of	The	Fountainhead.	For	anyone	who	wishes	 to	know	
me,	that	 is	essential.	The	speci;ic	events	of	my	private	life	are	of	no	importance	
whatever.	 I	 have	 never	 had	 any	 private	 life	 in	 the	 usual	 sense	 of	 the	word.	My	
writing	is	my	life.’ 		9
					As	political	scholar	and	libertarian	theorist	Chris	Matthew	Sciabarra	remarks,	
Rand’s	 self-portrait	 ‘verges	 on	 the	 rei;ication	 of	 her	 intellect	 as	 a	 disembodied	
abstraction	…	this	is	strange	as	Rand	herself	often	paid	close	attention	to	context	












in	 her	 rejection	 of	 such	 “false	 alternatives”	 as	 materialism	 and	 idealism,	
intrinsicism	 and	 subjectivism,	 rationalism	 and	 empiricism’,	 observes	 Sciabarra.	





to	her	 time	 in	St.	Petersburg.	His	pioneering	book	was	 the	 ;irst	 to	 suggest	 that	
_ 	4
Rand’s	 studies	 in	 the	years	 immediately	 following	 the	Russian	Revolution	must	
be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 any	 serious	 assessment	 of	 her	 philosophical	 work.	
During	her	time	at	the	Stoiunin	Gymnasium	and	later	in	the	Department	of	Social	
Pedagogy	at	the	University	of	Petrograd,	Rand	would	have	encountered	the	most	
highly-regarded	 Hegelians	 of	 that	 era,	 the	most	 signi;icant	 of	 these	 being	 N.O.	
Lossky,	who	held	a	position	in	pre-WWI	Russian	philosophy	comparable	to	that	







;irst	 biographer	 Barbara	 Branden,	 Rand	 described	 Lossky	 as	 a	 ‘distinguished	
international	 authority	 on	 Plato’	 –	 though	 this	 was	 not	 his	 primary	 area	 of	
expertise	 –	 and	 recalled	 with	 pride	 that	 Lossky	 had	 praised	 her	 forthright	
rejection	of	Platonism. 	The	passage	is	suggestive,	Sciabarra	points	out:	the	one	13




Burns	 reserves	 judgment,	 another	 recent	 biographer,	 Anne	 C.	 Heller	 endorses	
Sciabarra,	stating	that	Rand	‘learned	from	Lossky	an	intensely	dialectical	method	
of	thinking	–	“thinking	in	principles”,	she	called	it	–	which	helped	her	to	construct	
a	 worldview	 that	 was	 radically	 individualistic	 and	 seemingly	 Western	 but	 in	
some	ways	Russian	to	the	core.’ 	14
					But	Rand	was	far	from	short	on	teaching	material	that	set	out	the	background	
to	 historical	 materialism	 –	 and	 so	 one	 really	 has	 to	 question	 how	 Rand	 could	
have	failed	to	recognize	critical	procedures	taught	by	Lossky	/	other	Hegelians	at	
the	university	for	what	they	were.	In	semi-autobiographical	novel	We	the	Living	
(1936),	Rand	 lists	 the	 lectures	her	 character	Kira	 is	 forced	 to	 attend,	 satirizing	
the	 proportion	 of	 pro-Bolshevik	 material	 on	 the	 syllabus:	 ‘Proletarian	Women	
and	Illiteracy,’	‘The	Spirit	of	the	Collective’,	‘Proletarian	Electri;ication’,	‘The	Doom	
_ 	5
of	Capitalism’,	 ‘The	Red	Peasant’,	 ‘The	ABC	of	Communism’,	 ‘Comrade	Lenin	and	
Comrade	 Marx’	 and	 ‘Marx	 and	 Collectivism’. 	 Rand	 later	 complained	 that	 her	15
university	degree	program	 ‘began	with	Plato,	whom	 the	 regime	 claimed	 as	 the	
forerunner	to	historical	materialism,	then	went	to	Hegel,	then	to	Marx.’ 	‘For	the	16
rest	 of	 her	 life,’	 writes	 Barbara	 Branden,	 ‘Alice	 knew	 that	 she	 understood	 the	
theory	of	dialectical	materialism	–	and	had	on	her	body	and	spirit	the	scars	of	its	
practice	 –	 as	 few	 Americans	 would;	 she	 did	 not	 bear	 with	 equanimity	 the	




essay	 that	performs	 the	very	 ‘triple	somersaults’	Rand	ridicules	 in	 the	moment	
she	 criticizes	 the	 ‘plain	Witch-doctory	of	Hegel’. 	 If	not	 the	 result	of	 ignorance	18
nor	bad	faith,	might	this	apparent	discrepancy	between	the	values	expressed	and	
procedures	 employed	 indicate	 that	 Rand’s	 dialectical	 procedure	 was	 derived	
from	 a	 source	 she	 had	 good	 reason	 to	 regard	 as	 anti-Hegelian?	 The	 historical	
overview	 provided	 in	 ‘For	 the	 New	 Intellectual’	 certainly	 bears	 an	 astonishing	
resemblance	to	that	offered	by	renegade	Hegelian	Max	Stirner	in	the	second	part	
of	Der	Einzige	und	sein	Eigenthum:	that	historical	progression	from	1)	the	initial	
tyranny	 of	 physical	 facts	 –	 through	 2)	 the	 religious	 or	 ideological	 tyranny	 of	
shaman	/	priest	/	humanist	–	which	 ;inally	 culminates	 in	3)	 freedom	 for	 living	
Ego. 		19
	 	 	 	 	The	three	 ‘contestants’	described	in	Rand’s	essay	precisely	correspond	to	a	
speci;ically	Stirnerian	application	of	the	dialectical	method.	First,	there	is	Attila,	
‘the	man	who	rules	by	brute	force,	acts	on	the	range	of	the	moment,	is	concerned	
with	nothing	but	 the	physical	 reality	 immediately	before	him,	 respects	nothing	
but	man’s	muscles,	and	regards	a	;ist,	a	club	or	a	gun	as	the	only	answer	to	any	
problem’. 	Next,	the	Witch	Doctor,	 ‘the	man	who	dreads	physical	reality,	dreads	20
the	 necessity	 of	 practical	 action,	 and	 escapes	 into	 his	 emotions,	 into	 visions	 of	
some	mystic	 realm	where	his	wishes	 enjoy	 a	 supernatural	 power	unlimited	by	
the	absolutes	of	nature.’ 	And	though	these	two	;igures	–	the	man	of	 force	and	21
the	man	of	faith	–	might	appear	to	be	opposites,	they	share	‘a	consciousness	held	
down	 to	 the	 perceptual	 method	 of	 functioning,’	 which	 Rand	 glosses	 as	 an	
_ 	6
‘awareness	that	does	not	choose	to	extend	beyond	the	automatic,	the	immediate,	
the	given,	 the	 involuntary,	which	means:	an	animal’s	 “epistemology”.’	According	
to	 Rand,	 ‘Man’s	 consciousness	 shares	 with	 animals	 the	 ;irst	 two	 stages	 of	 its	






‘while	 animals	 survive	 by	 adjusting	 themselves	 to	 their	 background,	 man	
survives	by	adjusting	his	background	to	himself’. 	Like	Marsden	and	Lewis,	Rand	24
stresses	this	capacity	of	the	ego	to	transform	that	which	is	given	into	that	which	
is	 its	 own:	 the	 man	 of	 reason,	 is	 the	 Producer. 	 And,	 like	 Marsden,	 Rand	25
distinguishes	between	two	categories	–	broadly	corresponding	to	the	traditional	
Sciences	 and	 Humanities.	 ‘The	 professional	 businessman’,	 argues	 Rand,	 ‘is	 the	








in	 his	 own	 job	 and	has	 brought	men	 to	 spiritual	 bankruptcy.’ 	 As	 in	Time	and	28
Western	Man,	 Idealist	and	Empiricist	represent	a	relapse	to	earlier,	non-rational	
modes	of	being	–	Witch	Doctor	and	Attila,	respectively	–	two	“false	alternatives”	
persisting	 upon	 this	 second	 –	 more	 sophisticated	 –	 tier	 of	 the	 Stirnerian	
dialectic. 		29


























to	 every	 individual,	 consists	 of	 everybody	 except	 himself.’ 	 The	 egoism	 that	32
provided	 the	 initial	 impetus	 for	 Rand’s	 project	 has	 sometimes	 been	 likened	 to	
that	 of	 Nietzsche,	 but	 the	 particular	 thrust	 of	 her	 attack,	 in	 passages	 like	 this	
from	The	Virtue	of	SelIishness	(1964),	is	distinctly	Stirnerian	in	form	and	content,	
is	 on	 occasion	 near	word	 for	word:	 ‘since	 there	 is	 no	 such	 entity	 as	 “society”,’	
Rand	insists,	‘since	society	is	only	a	number	of	individual	men	–	this	means	that	
some	 men	 (the	 majority	 or	 any	 gang	 that	 claims	 to	 be	 its	 spokesman)	 are	
ethically	entitled	to	pursue	and	whims	(or	any	atrocities)	they	desire	to	pursue,	
while	other	men	are	ethically	obliged	 to	 spend	 their	 lives	 in	 the	 service	of	 that	
gang’s	desires.’ 		33




State,	 imagining	 that	 statism	would	 inevitably	wither	 away	 as	more	 and	more	






to	Galt’s	Gulch	 in	Atlas	Shrugged	we	have	a	 fantasy	 that	 is	closer	 than	anything	
produced	before	or	since	to	what	Max	Stirner	may	have	meant.	‘Here,’	Ellis	Wyatt	
tells	Dagney,	‘we	trade	achievements,	not	failures	–	values,	not	needs.	We’re	free	












But	 how	 to	 account	 for	 these	 parallels?	We	 have	 evidence	 to	 prove	 that	 Rand	
knew	of	Max	Stirner	by	the	beginning	of	the	Sixties	–	but	is	the	in;luence	of	that	
philosopher	 merely	 a	 late	 development,	 or	 is	 it	 still	 possible	 to	 conclude	 that	
these	unlikely	“Hegelian”	components	in	Rand’s	system	of	thought	were	acquired	
far	earlier,	during	her	formative	period,	in	Soviet	Russia,	as	Sciabarra	suggested?	
The	 available	 evidence	would	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 Rand	 did	 not	 possess	 Iirst-
hand	knowledge	of	Stirner	until	the	sixties	(and	perhaps	not	even	then).	 ‘These	
are	 the	vague	beginnings	of	 an	amateur	philosopher’,	writes	Rand,	 in	her	 ‘First	




said.’ 	 –	 Subsequent	 entries	 indicate	 that	 Rand	worked	 through	 a	 reading-list	36
consisting	of	some	of	the	key	radical	right-wing	texts	of	the	era,	but	Stirner	had	
again	 fallen	 into	utter	obscurity,	 and	 the	only	name	 that	Rand	could	put	 to	 the	
body	 of	 ideas	 she	 had	 carried	with	 her,	 on	 leaving	 Russia	 for	 the	 New	World,	
remained	that	of	Friedrich	Nietzsche.		
					According	to	Barbara	Branden,	Rand	;irst	discovered	this	philosopher	while	at	
university,	when	 a	 cousin	 said	 to	 her,	 grinning	with	 a	 touch	 of	malice,	 ‘Here	 is	
someone	you	should	read,	because	he	beat	you	to	all	your	ideas.’	Intrigued,	Rand	
began	reading	Thus	Spake	Zarathustra.	In	Nietzsche,	Rand	believed	she	had	found	
a	writer	 ‘who	 felt	 as	 I	did	about	man,	who	saw	and	wanted	 the	heroic	 in	man;	
here	 was	 a	 writer	 who	 believed	 that	 a	 man	 should	 have	 a	 great	 purpose,	 a	
purpose	which	 is	 for	 his	 own	 sake,	 for	 his	 own	 happiness	 and	 his	 own	 sel;ish	
motives’. 	 His	 books	 would	 have	 a	 profound	 impact.	 ‘The	 seventeen-year-old	37
Rand	immediately	seized	upon	his	ideas,’	writes	Anne	C.	Heller,	‘including	his	call	
to	 discard	 old	 values	 and	 create	 new	 ones,	 his	 condemnation	 of	 altruism	 as	 a	




the	 superior	 man	 could	 not	 be	 bothered	 enslaving	 others,	 that	 slavery	 is	
immoral,	 that	 to	enslave	his	 inferiors	 is	 an	unworthy	occupation	 for	 the	heroic	
man.’ 	According	to	Barbara	Branden,	when	Rand	read	further	in	Nietzsche	and	39
found	in	The	Birth	of	Tragedy	he	was	‘statedly	anti-reason’,	her	early	enthusiasm	
began	 to	 abate.	 ‘He	 said	 that	 reason	 is	 an	 inferior	 faculty,’	 remembered	 Rand,	
‘that	 drunken-orgy	 emotions	 were	 superior.	 That	 ;inished	 him	 as	 a	 spiritual	
ally.’ 		40
					Rand	is	here	somewhat	misleading.	It	is	precisely	those	aspects	of	Nietzschean	
thought	she	 later	professed	to	have	 immediately	disliked	which	 loom	largest	 in	
her	earliest	;ictional	writing.	In	detailed	plans	for	a	novel	to	have	been	called	‘The	












my	 methods.’ 	 Finally,	 early	 drafts	 for	 The	 Fountainhead	 indicate	 that	 Rand	41




a	 rapist,	 and,	of	 course,	ultimately	dynamites	a	housing	estate.	But,	 fortunately,	
Nietzschean	 traces	 such	 as	 these	 are	 obscured	 by	 lyrical	 passages	 celebrating	
Rand’s	new	(Stirnerian )	concept	of	egoism	as	rational	self-interest.	Though	her	42
contempt	 for	 the	masses	 resurfaces	 to	 disastrous	 effect	 in	Atlas	 Shrugged,	 it	 is	







land	 as	 unrelentingly	 hostile	 to	 the	 individual	 as	 Russia?	 ‘My	 feeling	 toward	











Russia	 during	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	were	 struggling	with	 a	







found	 (had	 she	 cared	 to	 look)	 an	 interpretation	 of	 Stirner	 that	 anticipated	 her	
own	 much-vaunted	 emphasis	 upon	 a	 rational	 egoism.	 ‘He	 preached	 radical	





of	 Nietzsche,	 Stirner	 and	 Ibsen	 continually	 increases	 …	 A	 number	 of	 recent	
writers	 have	 adopted	 anarchist	 views	 under	 the	 in;luence	 of	 these	 and	 other	
European	exemplars.	I	may	refer	to	F.	Sologub	with	his	solipsist	paroxysms;	and	
to	L.	Sestov,	an	imitator	of	Stirner	and	Nietzsche…’ 	47
	 	 	 	 	This	state	of	affairs	in	the	period	preceding	the	revolution	has	been	obscured	
by	 Soviet	 propaganda.	 ‘Consult	 any	 history	 of	 the	 Russian	 avant-garde’,	 Allan	
Antliff	 observes,	 ‘and	 you	 read	 that	 the	 artistic	 left	 pledged	 allegiance	 to	 the	
“October	 Revolution,”	 i.e.	 the	 Communist	 Party	 coup	 of	 1917	 and	 subsequent	
dictatorship.’ 	 As	 he	 and	 Nina	 Gurianova	 have	 discovered,	 in	 groundbreaking	48
studies	of	anarchy	and	art,	what	this	narrative	misrepresents	is	a	‘messy	history’	
of	 artistic	 rebellion	on	 the	part	 of	many	 in	 the	Russian	avant-garde	 in	 the	 ;irst	
years	of	the	Revolution:	‘when	anarchism,	not	Marxism,	was	the	raison	d’etre	of	




place	 between	 1905	 and	 1907,	 during	 the	 ;irst	 of	 the	 revolutions	 against	 the	
_ 	12
Tsarist	 regime.	 And	 signi;icantly,	 according	 to	 Gurianova,	 ‘The	 situation	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 century	 helped	 to	 promote	 different	 forms	 of	 anarcho-
individualism,	 rather	 than	 anarcho-syndicalism	 or	 anarcho-communism’. 	 This	50




	 	 	 	 	 In	 his	 presentation	 of	 Russian	 anarchist	 tendencies	 at	 the	 International	
Anarchist	Congress	in	1907,	for	instance,	anarcho-communist	Vladimir	Ivanovich	
Zabrezhnev	 (Fedorov)	 singled	 out	 Stirner’s	 philosophy	 for	 criticism,	 observing	
that	 the	 philosophy	 was	 proving	 popular	 –	 not	 with	 the	 factory-workers	 and	
revolutionary	 youth	 –	 but	 with	 an	 intelligentsia	 that	 ‘tried	 to	 keep	 away	 from	













Stirner’s	 individualist	 hero	 of	Der	 Einzige	 und	 sein	 Eigentum	 (The	 Ego	 and	 Its	
Own),	 a	 book	 that	had	 an	 immense	 in;luence	on	Russian	 culture,	 from	Apollon	
Griegoriev	 and	 Dostoevsky	 to	 the	 Futurists’,	 explains	 Gurianova.	 ‘Ignatiev	 and	
Gnedov	made	direct	 references	 to	 anarcho-individualist	 ideas	 in	 their	writings,	
for	example,	 in	Ignatiev’s	manifesto	“Ego-Futurism,”	he	praises	Ego-Futurism	as	
egovyi	anarchism’. 		54




Red,	 the	 Moscow	 Federation	 of	 Anarchists	 was	 running	 twenty-;ive	 anarchist	
clubs	across	the	capital,	and	distributing	ri;les,	pistols	and	grenades	to	a	militia	
known	as	 the	“Black	Guard”. 	According	 to	Antliff,	 these	clubs	were	more	 than	55
meeting-places;	 they	were	 radical	 cultural	 institutions.	 ‘For	 example,	 the	 “Dom	
Anarkhiia”	 (House	 of	 Anarchy),	where	 the	 federation’s	 of;icial	 paper	Anarkhiia	
was	 published,	 also	 featured	 a	 library	 and	 reading	 room,	 “proletarian	 art	
printing”	 facilities,	 a	poetry	 circle,	 and	a	 large	 theater	hall	 in	which	plays	were	
performed	 and	 lectures	 held’. 	 The	 radical	writers	 and	 artists	 that	 frequented	56
these	clubs	include	many	of	the	most	signi;icant	names	in	the	period,	 including	















To	 the	 sound	 of	 the	 funeral	 bells	 of	 color	 painting,	 the	 last	 “ism”	 is	
accompanied	on	its	way	to	eternal	peace,	the	last	love	and	hope	collapse,	














in	 St.	 Petersburg	 in	 the	 early	 1920s	 and	made	 their	 names	 by	 envisioning	 the	
utopian,	and	anti-utopian,	potential	of	the	decade’s	new	machines’. 	Rand	makes	58
(rather	vague)	 reference	 to	 this	modernist	material	 in	 interviews	with	Barbara	
Branden	 thirty	 years	 later.	 ‘There	were	 a	 couple	 of	modern	 novels	 by	 Russian	
writers	that	were	semi-anti-Soviet	or	thinly	veiled	anti-Soviet	that	I	liked	for	that	
reason,	 but	 that	was	minor’,	 she	 insisted.	 ‘I	 don’t	 even	 remember	 the	 authors’	
names.’ 	While	most	accept	 this	dismissal,	Heller	notes	 that	Rand’s	sci-;i	novel	59
Anthem	(1938)	‘clearly	re;lects	their	in;luence’. 		60
	 	 	 	 	Rand	would	recall	she	got	the	idea	for	this	book	in	her	school	days,	‘in	Soviet	
Russia,	 when	 [she]	 heard	 all	 the	 vicious	 attacks	 on	 individualism,	 and	 asked	
[herself]	what	the	world	would	be	like	if	men	lost	the	word	“I”. 	Though	Soviet	61















by	 a	 resurgent	 egoism:	 the	writer	 of	 each	 journal	 has	 begun	 to	 love	 a	 speci;ic	
woman	above	the	all,	thereby	reactivating	an	“atavistic”	ego	that	can	never	again	
_ 	15
be	at	one	with	 the	rest.	 In	 the	context	of	 this	essay,	 the	single	most	 interesting	
parallel	between	the	stories	of	D-503	and	Equality	7-2521	is	the	representation	
of	socialism	in	Stirnerian	terms,	as	merely	 the	reiteration	of	Christian	altruism,	











that	Rand	could	not	have	 taken	 from	half-a-dozen	utopias	 in	circulation	during	
the	twenties.	(Many	of	these	actually	put	into	print	by	Zamyatin	while	working	as	
an	 editor	 for	 the	World	 Literature	Publishing	House. )	As	Milgram	points	 out,	65
the	moral	purpose	underpinning	the	two	Russian	texts	is	not	especially	unusual	
either,	but	pervasive	in	work	of	writers	who	did	not	immediately	follow	the	path	















product,	 typical	 in	 every	 respect,	 of	 this	 speci;ic	 time	and	place,	 an	 intellectual	
milieu	saturated	by	radical	subjectivity.	 It	 is	now	possible	 to	understand	how	a	
_ 	16
precocious	undergraduate	might	have	come	to	assimilate	 the	key	premises	and	
methodological	 procedures	 at	 second-hand	 never	 knowing	 of	 their	 provenance.	
The	writing	of	Ayn	Rand	can	now	be	recognized	as	a	belated	contribution	to	that	
extraordinary	moment	in	the	history	of	First	Wave	Modernism	when	writers	and	








reason.	 ‘The	 advocacy	 of	 individualism	 as	 such	 is	 not	 new’,	 writes	 Nathaniel	




in	 those	 critical	 pieces	 that	 consider	Anthem	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 nineteenth	 and	
twentieth	century	history	of	the	literary	utopia.		
	 	 	 	 	By	 far	 the	most	comprehensive	evaluation	of	 this	kind	 is	 that	of	Shoshana	
Milgram,	 who	 compares	 Rand’s	 novel	 to	 Fyodor	 Dostoevsky’s	 Notes	 from	
Underground,	 H.G.	 Wells’s	 The	 Time	 Machine,	 The	 Sleeper	 Wakes,	 A	 Modern	
Utopia,	John	W.	Campbell’s	‘Twilight’,	E.M.	Forster’s	‘The	Machine	Stops’,	Yevgeny	
Zamyatin’s	We,	Aldous	Huxley’s	Brave	New	World,	Stephen	Benet’s	 ‘The	Place	of	
the	 Gods’,	 and	 George	 Orwell’s	 1984.	 In	 this	 context	 the	 rationalist	 turn	
highlighted	by	Nathaniel	Branden,	the	break	with	‘irrational’	forms	of	egoism,	is	
unarguably	 the	 most	 distinctive	 aspect	 of	 Rand’s	 intervention.	 For	 her	 work	
emerges	as	the	;irst	to	challenge	the	conviction	that	the	future	most	to	be	feared	
is	 the	 tyranny	 of	 Reason.	 The	 city	 of	 glass	 in	 Zamyatin,	 for	 instance,	 ‘this	
extremely	transparent	and	permanent	crystal’,	is	an	imaginative	projection	of	the	
Crystal	 Palace	 described	 by	Dostoevsky;	 the	 regimentation	 of	 One-State	makes	
real	the	possibility	of	a	‘mathematical	table’	to	regulate	desires	imagined	by	the	
Underground	 Man. 	 But	 as	 Heller	 points	 out,	 ‘Rand	 concluded	 –	 long	 before	68
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most	 others	 –	 that	 totalitarianism	 doesn’t	 work,	 because	 the	 independent	




the	 INTEGRAL).	 The	 abolition	 of	 the	 “I”	 is	 instead	 shown	 to	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	
physical	 as	well	 as	 spiritual	 degradation.	 The	 candle	 is	 the	most	 sophisticated	
invention	to	have	been	produced	by	her	Committee	of	Scholars	–	and	this	is	said	
to	 have	 taken	 ;ifty	 years.	Milgram	 concludes	 that	where	 the	Underground	Man	
had	 turned	on	mathematics	as	 the	 fundamental	quality	of	 the	Crystal	Palace	at	
which	he	wished	to	hurl	stones,	Rand	rejects	this	unwarranted	assault	on	reason	
and	 technology:	 –	 ‘reason	 is	 an	 individual	 act,	 a	 volitional	 act,	 and	 is	 thus	
anything	but	the	enemy	of	freedom’. 	In	line	with	this	shift,	Rand	imagines	that	70
individual	 rebellion	 against	 any	 form	of	 collective	 oppression	must	 necessarily	
manifest	itself	 in	thinking	for	oneself,	rather	than	being	driven	by	subconscious	
impulses.	 In	Notes	 from	 Underground,	 the	 narrator	 asks,	 ‘What	 do	 the	 laws	 of	
nature	and	arithmetic	have	to	do	with	me,	if	for	some	reason,	I	don’t	happen	to	
like	those	laws	and	that	twice	two	is	four?’ 	In	Atlas	Shrugged,	Galt	replies,	‘the	71







requires	 the	 practice	 of	 reason;	 the	 latter	 two	 had	 even	 attempted	 something	
resembling	 that	peculiar	 fusion	of	 egoism	and	Aristotelian	Thomism	 that	Rand	
took	 such	 particular	 pride	 in:	 ‘In	 philosophy	 I	 can	 only	 recommend	 the	 Three	
“A”s,	 ‘	she	would	often	say;	 ‘Aristotle,	Aquinas	and	Ayn	Rand!’	The	move	toward	
reason	 is	clearly	not	the	most	distinctive	aspect	of	Rand’s	philosophy,	 though	 it	
may	be	the	most	interesting	–	and	appealing.		
	 	 	 	 	In	fact,	the	true	break	with	previous	writing	in	this	Stirnerian	and	Modernist	
tradition	is	a	consequence	of	her	refusal	to	question	a	key	premise	underpinning	
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the	 subjectivist	 rebellion	against	utopia;	her	originality	within	 the	new	context	
that	 has	 been	 established	 in	 this	 essay	 is	 the	direct	 result	 of	 an	unquestioning	
acceptance	of	 the	assumption	that	whim	 is	a	characteristic	of	 the	subconscious.	





Richard	 Cornuelle,	 written	 in	 1954,	 when	 he	 claims:	 ‘she	 actually	 denies	 all	
individuality	whatsoever!’	His	reason	for	saying	so	would	have	provoked	nothing	
but	 scorn	 from	Rand,	 for	 he	 is	 clearly	 adopting	 the	 subjectivist	 or	 irrationalist	






[therefore]	 whatsoever,	 why	 Ayn,	 for	 example,	 shouldn’t	 sleep	 with	 Nathan’,	
Rothbard	concludes. 	The	 faculty	of	 reason	has	been	set	up	above	and	beyond	74
the	self	–	in	a	totalizing	system	that	must	refuse	to	accept	as	fully	human	anyone	
that	refuses	to	conform	to	what	is	deemed	reason.	The	rational	self	 is	rendered	
impervious	 to	any	 further	analysis	 (αναλυωa:	 “I	unravel”)	–	Stirner’s	perpetual	
negation	 of	 the	 posited	 persona.	 This	 is	 the	 point	 whereon	 Rand	 differs	 most	





breathtaking	 feats	 of	 self-reinvention	 (not	 least	 when	 a	 young	 Russian	 called	
Alyssa	Rosenbaum	 transformed	herself	 into	 the	American	Rand)	disorientating	
those	around	her	with	sudden,	unacknowledged	reorganizations	of	her	personal	
history.	 That	 Rand	 possessed	 this	 capacity	 for	 ecstasy	 or	 ek-stasis,	 for	 standing	
forth	 from	 her	 given	 situation,	 is	 only	 surprising	 if	 one	 accepts	 her	 Objectivist	
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philosophy.	 In	 fact,	 ‘it	 is	 our	 very	 incapacity	…	 to	 constitute	ourselves	 as	being	
what	we	are’,	remarks	Sartre,	‘which	means	that,	as	soon	as	we	posit	ourselves	as	




are	 is	 the	 very	moment	 of	 death.	 No	 longer	 is	 there	 this	nothing	 between	 our	
selves	and	our	past:	we	become	our	past,	;ixed	forever,	an	empirical	fact.	But	like	




existent.	 (For	 example,	 see	 Existentialism.)	 This	 fallacy	 breeds	 such	
symptoms	 as	 the	 notion	 that	 presence	 and	 absence,	 or	 being	 and	 non-
being,	 are	 metaphysical	 forces	 of	 equal	 power,	 and	 that	 being	 is	 the	
absence	 of	 non-being.	 E.g.,	 “Nothingness	 is	 prior	 to	 being.”	 (Sartre)	 –	
“Human	;initude	is	the	presence	of	the	not	in	the	being	of	man.”	(William	
Barrett)	 –	 “Nothing	 is	more	 real	 than	nothing.”	 (Samuel	Beckett)	 –	 “Das	
Nichts	nichtet”	or	“Nothing	noughts.”	(Heidegger).	“Consciousness,	then,	is	
not	a	stuff,	but	a	negation.	The	subject	is	not	a	thing,	but	a	non-thing.	The	
subject	 carves	 its	 own	 world	 out	 of	 Being	 by	 means	 of	 negative	
determinations.	 Sartre	 describes	 consciousness	 as	 a	 ‘noughting	 nought	
(néant	néantisant).	It	is	a	form	of	being	other	than	its	own:	a	mode	‘which	




















might	 have	 been	 imposed	 from	 outside	 because	 all-pervasive,	 internalized.	
Where	 Stirner	 resolved	 to	 become	 his	 own	 cause	 and	 to	 set	 this	 cause	 upon	
nothing,	Rand	 relinquished	 the	 capacity	 for	 self-analysis	 that	 alone	 guaranteed	
the	freedom	of	the	ego	–	and	thereby	lapsed	from	egoism	into	mere	chauvinism,	
that	is	to	say,	the	subordination	of	the	self	to	a	cause	that	appears	to	require	no	
sacri;ice	 (as	 in	 altruism)	because	 the	 cause	 is	 ones	own,	 but	which	 for	 all	 that	







has	observed	 that	 ‘although	 it	 is	easy	 to	dismiss	 the	very	mention	of	Rand	 in	a	
“serious”	 theoretical	 article	 as	 an	 obscene	 extravaganza	 –	 artistically,	 she	 is	 of	
course,	 worthless	 –	 the	 properly	 subversive	 dimension	 of	 her	 ideological	
procedure	is	not	to	be	underestimated.’ 	 In	fact,	Žižek	then	goes	on	to	suggest,	78





















;inancial	meltdown,	 and	 for	 the	 ongoing	 federal	 government	 shut	 down	 in	 the	
US.’ 	 Having	 persuaded	 her	 readers	 that	 ‘Big	 Business’	 is	 ‘America’s	 most	80
persecuted	minority’,	Rand	prevents	any	further	act	of	self-appraisal	 that	might	
prevent	 such	 sel;ishness	 from	 ossifying	 into	 a	 pursuit	 of	 ;ixed	 ideas	 that	
eventually	begin	to	work	against	their	own	self-interest.	Having	bought	the	Rand	
line	on	insurrection,	these	readers	are	“locked	into	the	product”	right	to	the	end.	
Let	 us	 be	 quite	 clear	 on	 this	 point.	 If	 the	 Union	 of	 States	 established	 by	 the	
American	Revolution	collapses	 this	will	be	because	 those	with	 the	most	 to	 lose	
from	 such	 a	 scenario	 have	 consciously	 adopted	 and	 consistently	 promoted	 a	
radical	Hegelian	philosophy	that	is	fundamentally	hostile	to	the	Lockean	political	
principles	 that	underpin	 the	system	upon	which	 they	depend.	 (A	 fact	not	often	
noted	 in	 relation	 to	 Rand’s	 last	 novel:	 even	 millionaires	 living	 in	 a	 ‘Utopia	 of	
Greed’	 are	 compelled,	 having	 effected	 the	 collapse	 of	 civilization,	 to	 muck	 out	
their	 own	 pigs	 by	 hand.)	Might	 the	 unrelenting	 insurrection	 of	 the	 Super-Rich	
actually	constitute	the	most	monstrous	self-abnegation?	–	This	 is	your	wake-up	
call.	Good	morning,	America!	
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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